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Credit risk with asymmetric information
and a switching default threshold
Abstract: We investigate the impact of available information on the estimation of the default probability
within a generalized structural model for credit risk. The traditional structural model where default is
triggered when the value of the firm’s asset falls below a constant threshold is extended by relaxing the
assumption of a constant default threshold. The default threshold at which the firm is liquidated is modeled
as a random variable whose value is chosen by the management of the firm and dynamically adjusted to
account for changes in the economy or the appointment of a new firm management. Investors on the market
have no access to the value of the threshold and only anticipate the distribution of the threshold. We
distinguish different information levels on the firm’s assets and derive explicit formulas for the conditional
default probability given these information levels. Numerical results indicate that the information level has
a considerable impact on the estimation of the default probability and the associated credit yield spread.
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1 Introduction
Credit risk, or default risk, is the risk that a financial loss will be incurred if a counterparty does not
fulfill its contractually agreed financial obligations in a timely manner. Quantitative credit risk models for
measuring, monitoring and managing credit risk have become central in today’s complex financial industry.
The recent financial crisis has impressively demonstrated the need for effective credit risk management.
Since then the evaluation of credit risk has been receiving increasing attention. For credit risk analysis it is
crucial both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view to model the default of a default risky asset,
i.e., a security that has a nonzero probability of defaulting on its contracted payments, and to forecast the
associated default probability. A typical example of a credit risky asset is a corporate bond. A corporate
bond promises its holder a fixed stream of payments but may default on its promise.
There are two classical types of modeling approaches for credit risk: the structural one and the reduced-form
one. The structural approach is considered by Black & Scholes [3],Merton [18] and Black & Cox [2],
among others. It provides a relationship between default risk and capital structure by using the evolution
of the firm’s assets value to determine the time of default, i.e., the default event of a bond is triggered
when the assets of the firm who issued the bond fall below some threshold. The important feature of the
structural model is that it implicitly assumes that the modeler has complete knowledge about the dynamics
of the firm’s assets and the situation that will trigger the default event (i.e., the firm’s liabilities). Despite
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the convincing economic interpretation in terms of the firm’s assets and liabilities there are shortcomings
when the firm’s assets are modeled by a continuous-time asset value process. One is that credit yield spreads
go to zero as maturity goes to zero regardless of the riskiness of the firm. This results from the investors’
knowledge about the firm’s true distance to default. Such credit spreads are uncommon in practice. Another
disadvantage of the structural approach is that forecast bond prices continuously converge to their recovery
value (the payment which is received if default occurs before maturity) which contradicts the price jump at
default in empirical studies. These issues do not occur in the second approach, the reduced-form approach,
which is considered by Jarrow & Turnbull [13], Artzner & Delbaen [1], and Duffie & Singleton
[7], among others. It treats the dynamics of default as an exogenous event. This implies knowledge of a
less detailed information set compared to the structural approach and credit spreads become in general
more realistic and are easier to quantify. Another advantage is that the reduced-form approach has proven
to be very useful for the valuation of credit-sensitive securities. However, the approach is lacking economic
insights as it does not connect credit risk to underlying structural variables. To gain both the economic
appeal of the structural approach and the empirical plausibility and the tractability of the reduced-form
approach, structural models can be transformed into reduced-form models by changing its information set
to a less refined one (see Jarrow & Protter [12]). One way is to model the default barrier as a random
variable which is unobservable by bond investors (see Lando [17], Giesecke & Goldberg [8], Hillairet
& Jiao [11]). Another way is to assume that the firm’s assets are only partially observable by investors
(see Duffie & Lando [6], Jeanblanc & Valchev [14], Lakner & Liang [16]).
This paper extends the traditional structural model to a dynamic setting by relaxing the assumption of a
constant default threshold to the case of a piecewise constant threshold. Motivated by default events during
the financial crisis where a firm’s management has decided to close activities and the default occurs although
the firm is in a relatively healthy situation (see Hillairet & Jiao [11]), the default threshold is modeled
as a random variable whose value is chosen by the management of the firm and adjusted dynamically to
react to changes in the economic environment or to account for the election of a new firm management.
In literature, this generalization of the default model to a dynamic setting was proposed by Blanchet-
Scalliet, Hillairet & Jiao [4]. The authors study the information accessible to the management of the
firm and obtain explicit formulations for the survival probability given the information of the management
by using a successive enlargement framework. Our approach is different and related to ordinary investors
on the market who do not have access to the value of the threshold and only anticipate the distribution
of the threshold. The objective is to analyze the impact of available information of public bond investors
on the estimation of the default probability. We consider an investor who continuously observes the firm
value and an investor who only observes the firm value at discrete dates. Explicit formulas for the default
probabilities and associated credit yield spreads given the different information levels on the firm’s assets
are derived and, based on these formulas, as a direct application the valuation of bond prices is considered.
Numerical examples are presented to illustrate and compare the conditional default probabilities and credit
spreads.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a model for credit risk based on
a structural model but with an unobservable default barrier that is allowed to switch. In this setting
different information structures are distinguished. The impact of asymmetric information on the default
probability is studied in Section 3 where explicit formulas for the conditional survival probabilities given
the different information structures are derived. Section 4 provides numerical results and a conclusion is
given in Section 5. Finally, the Appendix contains proofs omitted from the main text.
2 Model for the default event
We introduce a structural model for credit risk where short-term default risk is included by making the
default barrier unobservable. Further, the usual assumption of a constant default barrier is relaxed allowing
the firm’s management to adjust the barrier.
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2.1 Default barrier
The default event is specified in terms of the firm’s asset value process (𝑋𝑡)𝑡≥0 and the default threshold 𝐿.
Default occurs when the value of the firm decreases to the level of the default barrier for the first time. The
random time of default is denoted by 𝜏 . Uncertainty in the economy is modeled by some fixed complete
probability space (Ω,𝒜,P) which is endowed with the filtration F = (ℱ𝑡)𝑡≥0 generated by the asset process
𝑋 and satisfying the usual conditions, i.e., ℱ𝑡 = 𝜎(𝑋𝑠 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡) ∨ 𝒩 , where 𝒩 denotes the P-null sets. The
𝜎-algebra 𝒜 of Ω describes the information of the market. We model the evolution of the value 𝑋 of the
firm’s assets by a geometric Brownian motion, i.e.,
d𝑋𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡(𝜇d𝑡+ 𝜎d𝐵𝑡), 𝑋0 = 𝑥0, (1)
where (𝐵𝑡)𝑡≥0 is a F-Brownian motion, 𝜇 ∈ R and 𝜎 > 0. The solution to (1) is known to be
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑥0𝑒𝑚𝑡+𝜎𝐵𝑡 , (2)
where 𝑚 = 𝜇 − 𝜎2/2. For the sake of easier notation we assume w.l.o.g. 𝑥0 = 1, i.e., we assume that the
asset process starts at 1. We say that a firm defaults when it stops fulfilling a contractual commitment
to meet its obligations stated in a financial contract. The firm’s management decides whether and when
to default. Thus, the management determines the default triggering barrier. The essential difference with
a classical structural model is that the management is not constrained to decide on one fixed barrier
but can dynamically adjust the default barrier. This reflects the management’s possibility to react to
changes in the economic environment or the election of a new firm management. The time points at which
the management adjusts the default barrier are deterministic and denoted by 𝑡𝑖, 𝑖 = 0, . . . , 𝑛 − 1, with
0 = 𝑡0 < 𝑡1 < . . . < 𝑡𝑛−1 < 𝑇 , where 𝑇 =: 𝑡𝑛 is a finite time horizon. The default barrier 𝐿 can be written
as
𝐿𝑡 =
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐿𝑖1[𝑡𝑖−1,𝑡𝑖),
where 𝐿𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛 are 𝒜-measurable random variables representing the private information of the
management on the default barrier and 1𝐴 denotes the indicator function of the set 𝐴. Public investors
do not have any knowledge on the default barrier except that they know the adjustment time points
𝑡0, . . . , 𝑡𝑛−1 and they agree on the joint probability distributions for 𝐿1, . . . , 𝐿𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛, which are
denoted by 𝐹𝐿1,...,𝐿𝑖 . The associated probability density functions are denoted by 𝑓𝐿1,...,𝐿𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛.
(a) No default (b) Default
Fig. 1. Plot of two trajectories of the firm’s asset process 𝑋𝑡, the associated running minimum process
𝑀[𝑡𝑖−1,𝑡) and the default thresholds 𝐿𝑖.
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We make the assumption that L = (𝐿1, . . . , 𝐿𝑛) is independent of ℱ𝑇 . The random default time is given
by 𝜏 = inf{𝑡 > 0: 𝑋𝑡 ≤ 𝐿𝑡}. The running minimum asset process is denoted by 𝑀 and given by
𝑀𝑡 = inf{𝑋𝑢 : 0 ≤ 𝑢 < 𝑡}. (3)
Further, the running minimum started from a certain time point 𝑠 is denoted by
𝑀[𝑠,𝑡) = inf{𝑋𝑢 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑢 < 𝑡}. (4)
For 𝑠 = 0 we have 𝑀[0,𝑡) = 𝑀𝑡. This model setup is illustrated by Figure 1 which shows two trajectories
of the firm value 𝑋, 𝑛 = 3 default barriers 𝐿1, 𝐿2 and 𝐿3 and the three running minimum processes
𝑀[𝑡𝑖−1,𝑡𝑖), for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario shown in the left panel occurs no
default whereas in the second scenario shown in the right panel default occurs between 𝑡2 and 𝑡3 = 𝑇 .
2.2 Information structure
We distinguish the following three information structures.
Management’s information
The management has complete information about the firm’s asset process 𝑋 and obtains information on
the default threshold 𝐿𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑖−1. Thus, the management’s information structure G𝑀 = (𝒢𝑀𝑡 )𝑡∈[0,𝑇 ]
is a progressive enlargement of the filtration F by the default threshold process (𝐿𝑡)𝑡≥0, i.e.,
𝒢𝑀𝑡 = ℱ𝑡 ∨ 𝜎(𝐿𝑠, 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡).
This insider information is considered in Blanchet-Scalliet, Hillairet & Jiao [4] and will not be
considered in this paper.
For public bond investors we distinguish the following two information structures.
C-investor’s information
The first type of investors continuously observe the firm value and the default in the moment it occurs
but they do not have knowledge on the default threshold 𝐿 (because it is firm inside information of the
management). We call an investor endowed with this information structure a C-investor. The C-investor’s
information structure G𝐶 = (𝒢𝐶𝑡 )𝑡∈[0,𝑇 ] on the bond market is described by a progressive enlargement of
the filtration F by the random default time 𝜏 , i.e.,
𝒢𝐶𝑡 = ℱ𝑡 ∨ 𝜎(𝐻𝑠, 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡),
where 𝐻 is the default indicator process defined by 𝐻𝑡 = 1{𝑡≥𝜏}. C-investors are uncertain about the firm’s
true distance to default although they have complete information about the firm value. This uncertainty
is due to lacking knowledge on the threshold level. Thus, default arrives as a full surprise.
D-investor’s information
The second type of investors observe the asset process only in discrete time and are called D-investors. The
information structure of a D-investor is similar to the information structure of a C-investor in that both
investors do not have any knowledge about the default barrier except that they observe the occurrence
and timing of default. The difference is that the asset process 𝑋 is not completely observable but only at
discrete dates denoted by 𝑇𝑗 , 𝑗 = 0, . . . , 𝐽 − 1, where 0 = 𝑇0 < 𝑇1 < . . . < 𝑇𝐽−1 < 𝑇𝐽 = 𝑇 for 𝐽 ∈ N.
This is a realistic assumption, since investors usually observe the asset value at the times of corporate news
release. The partial information on the asset process is described by a sub-filtration F𝐷 = (ℱ𝐷𝑡 )𝑡∈[0,𝑇 ] of
F, where
ℱ𝐷𝑡 =
{︃
ℱ0, if 𝑡 < 𝑇1,
𝜎(𝑋𝑇1 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖) if 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑇𝑖+1, 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝐽 − 1}.
The D-investor’s information structure G𝐷 = (𝒢𝐷𝑡 )𝑡∈[0,𝑇 ] can be described by a progressive enlargement
of the filtration F𝐷 by the random default time 𝜏 , i.e.,
𝒢𝐷𝑡 = ℱ𝐷𝑡 ∨ 𝜎(𝐻𝑠, 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡).
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Assumption 2.1. Every adjustment time 𝑡𝑖, 𝑖 = 0, . . . , 𝑛− 1, of the default barrier coincides with one of
the information dates 𝑇𝑗 , 𝑗 = 0, . . . , 𝐽 − 1, i.e., {𝑡0, . . . , 𝑡𝑛−1} ⊆ {𝑇0, . . . , 𝑇𝐽−1}.
3 Conditional survival probability
The conditional survival probability, i.e., the probability of not having experienced default by the finite
time horizon 𝑇 given the accessible information, plays an important role in the valuation of credit risky
securities (see Hillairet & Jiao [10]). The aim of this section is to derive explicit formulas for the
conditional survival probability given the information of a C-investor, i.e., P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢𝐶𝑡 ), and of a D-
investor, i.e., P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢𝐷𝑡 ).
We begin with reviewing classical results of the running minimum of a geometric Brownian motion.
Lemma 3.1. Let 𝑋 = (𝑋𝑡)𝑡≥0 be the asset value process given in (1) with 𝑋0 = 1 and 𝑀 = (𝑀𝑡)𝑡≥0 the
running minimum process defined in (3).
1. Given 𝑡 > 0 then the density function 𝑓𝑀𝑡 (·) of 𝑀𝑡 is given by
𝑓𝑀𝑡 (𝑤) =
1
𝜎𝑤
√
𝑡
𝜙
(︁𝑚𝑡− ln𝑤𝜎√
𝑡
)︁
+ 𝑒
2𝑚 ln𝑤𝜎
𝜎𝑤
√
𝑡
𝜙
(︁𝑚𝑡+ ln𝑤𝜎√
𝑡
)︁
+ 2𝑚
𝑤𝜎
𝑒2𝑚
ln𝑤
𝜎 𝛷
(︁𝑚𝑡+ ln𝑤𝜎√
𝑡
)︁
(5)
for 𝑤 ∈ (0, 1] and zero otherwise, where 𝛷 and 𝜙 denote the cumulative distribution function and the
probability density function of the standard normal distribution, respectively.
2. Given 𝑡 > 0 then the joint probability density function 𝑓𝑀,𝑋𝑡 (·, ·) of 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑀𝑡 is given by
𝑓𝑀,𝑋𝑡 (𝑢, 𝑣) =
2𝑣𝑚/𝜎2−1 ln(𝑣/𝑢2)
𝜎3
√
2𝜋𝑡3/2𝑢
𝑒−
𝑚2𝑡
2𝜎2 𝑒−
ln2(𝑣/𝑢2)
2𝜎2𝑡 (6)
for 𝑢 ∈ (0, 1], 𝑢 ≤ 𝑣, and zero otherwise.
Proof. The above formulas are a corollary to the results given in Harrison [9, Ch. 1].
Lemma 3.2. Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.1 the complementary distribution function Ψ of 𝑀 is
given by
Ψ(𝑡, 𝑢) = P(𝑀𝑡 > 𝑢) = 𝛷
(︂− ln(𝑢) +𝑚𝑡
𝜎
√
𝑡
)︂
− exp
{︂
2𝑚
𝜎2
ln(𝑢)
}︂
𝛷
(︂
ln(𝑢) +𝑚𝑡
𝜎
√
𝑡
)︂
(7)
for 𝑡 > 0, 𝑢 ≤ 1. Further, it holds Ψ(𝑡, 𝑢) = 0 for 𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑢 > 1 and Ψ(0, 𝑢) = 1 for 𝑢 ≤ 1.
Proof. The proof is given in Jeanblanc & Valchev [14, Lemma 2].
3.1 C-investor’s information case
The next theorem shows that the conditional survival probability given the information of a C-investor can
be formulated in terms of F-conditional survival probabilities for which we derive explicit formulas.
Theorem 3.3. Let 𝑋 = (𝑋𝑡)𝑡≥0 be the asset value process given in (1) with 𝑋0 = 1. Further, let 𝑀𝑡 be the
associated running minimum started at zero defined in (3) and 𝑀[𝑠,𝑡) be the associated running minimum
started at a certain time point 𝑠 defined in (4). Then, for the conditional survival probability given the
information of a C-investor it holds
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢𝐶𝑡 ) = 1{𝜏>𝑡}
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝑡)
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝑡) , for 𝑡 < 𝑇, (8)
where the F-conditional survival probabilities are given by the following formulas for 𝑛 ≥ 2:
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1. For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑖−1, 𝑡𝑖), 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛− 1, we have
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝑡) =
∫︁∫︁
[0,1]×[𝑢,∞)
. . .
∫︁∫︁
[0,1]×[𝑢,∞)
𝑓
̂︀𝑀,̂︀𝑋
𝑡𝑖−𝑡 (𝑢𝑖, 𝑣𝑖)
𝑛−1∏︁
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑓
̂︀𝑀,̂︀𝑋
𝑡𝑗−𝑡𝑗−1(𝑢𝑗 , 𝑣𝑗)
1∫︁
0
𝐹𝐿1,...,𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑡1 ,𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡2), . . . ,𝑀[𝑡𝑖−2,𝑡𝑖−1),min(𝑀[𝑡𝑖−1,𝑡), 𝑢𝑖𝑋𝑡),
𝑢𝑖+1𝑣𝑖𝑋𝑡, . . . , 𝑢𝑛−1𝑣𝑛−2 . . . 𝑣𝑖𝑋𝑡, 𝑤𝑣𝑛−1 . . . 𝑣𝑖𝑋𝑡)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑇−𝑡𝑛−1(𝑤)
d𝑤d𝑣𝑛−1d𝑢𝑛−1 . . . d𝑣𝑖d𝑢𝑖, (9)
where 𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑡 and 𝑓 ̂︀𝑀,̂︀𝑋𝑡 are given in (5) and (6), respectively.
For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑛−1, 𝑇 ) it holds
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝑡) =
1∫︁
0
𝐹𝐿1,...,𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑡1 ,𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡2), . . . ,𝑀[𝑡𝑛−2,𝑡𝑛−1),min(𝑀[𝑡𝑛−1,𝑡), 𝑤𝑋𝑡))𝑓
̂︀𝑀
𝑇−𝑡(𝑤)d𝑤. (10)
2. For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑖−1, 𝑡𝑖), 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛, it holds
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝑡) = 𝐹𝐿1,...,𝐿𝑖(𝑀𝑡1 ,𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡2), . . . ,𝑀[𝑡𝑖−2,𝑡𝑖−1),𝑀[𝑡𝑖−1,𝑡)). (11)
Proof. We obtain Eq. (8) by using classical results of progressive enlargement (see Jeanblanc, Yor
& Chesney [15, Sec. 7.3.3]). For the sake of simpler notation the proof of the F-conditional survival
probabilities is only given for 𝑛 = 2, i.e., the threshold is 𝐿1 in the interval [𝑡0, 𝑡1) and 𝐿2 in the interval
[𝑡1, 𝑇 ). The proof for 𝑛 > 2 is along the same line and skipped.
Eq. (2) yields that for 𝑠 > 𝑡 the firm value 𝑋𝑠 can be expressed by
𝑋𝑠 = 𝑋𝑡 exp{𝑚(𝑠− 𝑡) + 𝜎(𝐵𝑠 −𝐵𝑡)} = 𝑋𝑡 exp{𝑚(𝑠− 𝑡) + 𝜎(𝐵𝑠−𝑡+𝑡 −𝐵𝑡)}
= 𝑋𝑡 exp{𝑚(𝑠− 𝑡) + 𝜎 ̂︀𝐵𝑠−𝑡} = 𝑋𝑡𝑌𝑠−𝑡,
where ( ̂︀𝐵𝑢)𝑢≥0 given by ̂︀𝐵𝑢 = 𝐵𝑢+𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡 is a Brownian motion starting at zero and independent of ℱ𝑡.
The process (𝑌𝑢)𝑢≥0 given by 𝑌𝑢 = exp{𝑚𝑢+ 𝜎 ̂︀𝐵𝑢} is independent of ℱ𝑡 and it holds
𝑌𝑢 =
𝑋𝑡+𝑢
𝑋𝑡
𝑑= 𝑋𝑢.
Proof of (9): Let 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡0, 𝑡1) be fixed, then we can describe the event that no default occurs until the
maturity time 𝑇 by
{𝜏 > 𝑇} = {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑡1,𝑇 )} = {𝐿1 < inf𝑠<𝑡1𝑋𝑠} ∩ {𝐿
2 < inf
𝑡1≤𝑠<𝑇
𝑋𝑠}
= {𝐿1 < inf
𝑠<𝑡
𝑋𝑠} ∩ {𝐿1 < inf
𝑡≤𝑠<𝑡1
𝑋𝑠} ∩ {𝐿2 < inf
𝑡1≤𝑠<𝑇
𝑋𝑠}
= {𝐿1 < inf
𝑠<𝑡
𝑋𝑠} ∩ {𝐿1 < inf
𝑡≤𝑠<𝑡1
𝑋𝑡𝑌𝑠−𝑡} ∩ {𝐿2 < inf
𝑡1≤𝑠<𝑇
𝑋𝑡1𝑍𝑠−𝑡1},
where (𝑍𝑢)𝑢≥0 given by 𝑍𝑢 = exp{𝑚𝑢 + 𝜎 ̃︀𝐵𝑢} with the Brownian motion ( ̃︀𝐵𝑢)𝑢≥0 given by ̃︀𝐵𝑢 =
𝐵𝑢+𝑡1 − 𝐵𝑡1 is independent of ℱ𝑡1 and it holds 𝑍𝑢 𝑑= 𝑋𝑢. We denote by (̂︁𝑀𝑢)𝑢≥0 and (̃︁𝑀𝑢)𝑢≥0 the
running minimum of 𝑌 and 𝑍, respectively, i.e.,̂︁𝑀𝑢 = inf
𝑠<𝑢
𝑌𝑠 and ̃︁𝑀𝑢 = inf
𝑠<𝑢
𝑍𝑠.
Then it holds
{𝜏 > 𝑇} = {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡} ∩ {𝐿1 < ̂︁𝑀𝑡1−𝑡𝑋𝑡} ∩ {𝐿2 < ̃︁𝑀𝑇−𝑡1𝑋𝑡1}
= {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡} ∩ {𝐿1 < ̂︁𝑀𝑡1−𝑡𝑋𝑡} ∩ {𝐿2 < ̃︁𝑀𝑇−𝑡1𝑌𝑡1−𝑡𝑋𝑡}.
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Based on this representation the conditional survival probability until the maturity time 𝑇 given the
information ℱ𝑡 can be written as
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝑡) = P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡, 𝐿1 < ̂︁𝑀𝑡1−𝑡𝑋𝑡, 𝐿2 < ̃︁𝑀𝑇−𝑡1𝑌𝑡1−𝑡𝑋𝑡|ℱ𝑡)
=
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
𝑢
P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡, 𝐿1 < 𝑢𝑋𝑡, 𝐿2 < ̃︁𝑀𝑇−𝑡1𝑣𝑋𝑡|ℱ𝑡)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀,𝑌𝑡1−𝑡 (𝑢, 𝑣)d𝑣d𝑢
=
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
𝑢
1∫︁
0
P(𝐿1 < min (𝑀𝑡, 𝑢𝑋𝑡), 𝐿2 < 𝑤𝑣𝑋𝑡|ℱ𝑡)𝑓 ̃︀𝑀𝑇−𝑡1(𝑤)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀,𝑌𝑡1−𝑡 (𝑢, 𝑣)d𝑤d𝑣d𝑢
=
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
𝑢
1∫︁
0
𝐹𝐿1,𝐿2(min (𝑀𝑡, 𝑢𝑋𝑡), 𝑤𝑣𝑋𝑡)𝑓 ̃︀𝑀𝑇−𝑡1(𝑤)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀,𝑌𝑡1−𝑡 (𝑢, 𝑣)d𝑤d𝑣d𝑢.
We have exploited in the last equation the independence of (𝐿1, 𝐿2) from ℱ𝑇 .
Proof of (10): Let 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡1, 𝑇 ) be fixed, then we can describe the event that no default occurs until the
maturity time 𝑇 by
{𝜏 > 𝑇} = {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑡1,𝑇 )} = {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1} ∩ {𝐿2 < inf𝑡1≤𝑠<𝑡𝑋𝑠} ∩ {𝐿
2 < inf
𝑡≤𝑠<𝑇
𝑋𝑠}
= {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1} ∩ {𝐿2 < inf
𝑡1≤𝑠<𝑡
𝑋𝑠} ∩ {𝐿2 < inf
𝑡≤𝑠<𝑇
𝑋𝑡𝑌𝑠−𝑡}
= {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡)} ∩ {𝐿2 < ̂︁𝑀𝑇−𝑡𝑋𝑡}.
Based on this representation the conditional survival probability until the maturity time 𝑇 given the
information ℱ𝑡 can be calculated by
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝑡) = P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1 , 𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡), 𝐿2 < ̂︁𝑀𝑇−𝑡𝑋𝑡|ℱ𝑡)
=
1∫︁
0
P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1 , 𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡), 𝐿
2 < 𝑤𝑋𝑡|ℱ𝑡)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑇−𝑡(𝑤)d𝑤
=
1∫︁
0
𝐹𝐿1,𝐿2(𝑀𝑡1 ,min(𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡), 𝑤𝑋𝑡))𝑓
̂︀𝑀
𝑇−𝑡(𝑤)d𝑤.
Proof of (11): The conditional survival probability until time 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡0, 𝑡1) given the information ℱ𝑡 is
obtained by
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝑡) = P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡|ℱ𝑡) = 𝐹𝐿1(𝑀𝑡).
Finally, for 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡1, 𝑇 ) it holds
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝑡) = P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1 , 𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡)|ℱ𝑡) = 𝐹𝐿1,𝐿2(𝑀𝑡1 ,𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡)).
Remark 3.4. For 𝑛 = 1 we obtain as a special case the model proposed by Giesecke & Goldberg [8],
where the default barrier is constant but random, i.e., 𝐿𝑡 = 𝐿1. The conditional survival probability is
given by
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢𝐶𝑡 ) = 1{𝜏>𝑡}
∫︀ 1
0 𝐹𝐿1(min(𝑀𝑡, 𝑤𝑋𝑡))𝑓
̂︀𝑀
𝑇−𝑡(𝑤)d𝑤
𝐹𝐿1(𝑀𝑡)
, 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇 ). (12)
8 Redeker and Wunderlich, Credit risk with asymmetric information and a switching default threshold
Remark 3.5. Let 𝑛 = 2 and assume that 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 are independent with probability distribution
functions 𝐹𝐿1 and 𝐹𝐿2 , respectively. Then the conditional survival probability for 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡0, 𝑡1) is given
by
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢𝐶𝑡 ) =
1
𝐹𝐿1(𝑀𝑡)
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
𝑢
1∫︁
0
𝐹𝐿1(min (𝑀𝑡, 𝑢𝑋𝑡))𝐹𝐿2(𝑤𝑣𝑋𝑡)𝑓 ̃︀𝑀𝑇−𝑡1(𝑤)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀,𝑌𝑡1−𝑡 (𝑢, 𝑣)d𝑤d𝑣d𝑢
on the no default set {𝜏 > 𝑡}. For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡1, 𝑇 ) calculating the conditional survival probability reduces to the
case of a constant but random barrier. We have
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝑡) =
1∫︁
0
𝐹𝐿1,𝐿2(𝑀𝑡1 ,min(𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡), 𝑤𝑋𝑡))𝑓
̂︀𝑀
𝑇−𝑡(𝑤)d𝑤
= 𝐹𝐿1(𝑀𝑡1)
1∫︁
0
𝐹𝐿2(min(𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡), 𝑤𝑋𝑡))𝑓
̂︀𝑀
𝑇−𝑡(𝑤)d𝑤
and
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝑡) = 𝐹𝐿1,𝐿2(𝑀𝑡1 ,𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡)) = 𝐹𝐿1(𝑀𝑡1)𝐹𝐿2(𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡))
yielding the following simplified formula for the conditional survival probability
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢𝐶𝑡 ) = 1{𝜏>𝑡}
∫︀ 1
0 𝐹𝐿2(min(𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡), 𝑤𝑋𝑡))𝑓
̂︀𝑀
𝑇−𝑡(𝑤)d𝑤
𝐹𝐿2(𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡))
.
A direct application of the conditional survival probability is the pricing of credit derivatives such as
defaultable bonds. For example, let us consider a zero-coupon bond that matures at 𝑇 and has zero
recovery, i.e., the defaultable bond pays 1 at 𝑇 if there was no default by 𝑇 and zero otherwise. Assuming
that the pricing probability is P, then the price 𝐶𝑡 of such a financial product is given by
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)E[1{𝜏>𝑇} | 𝒢𝐶𝑡 ] = 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢𝐶𝑡 ) = 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)1{𝜏>𝑡}
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝑡)
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝑡) ,
where 𝑟 ≥ 0 is a discount factor. An important quantity in the credit risk analysis is the credit yield spread
𝑆𝑡 on a zero-coupon bond issued by a firm. It is the difference between the yield at time 𝑡 on a credit risky
and a credit risk-free zero-coupon bond, both maturing at 𝑇 . Thus, the credit spread 𝑆𝑡 is given by
𝑆𝑡 = − 1
𝑇 − 𝑡 ln{P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢
𝐶
𝑡 )}.
3.2 D-investor’s information case
n this subsection we consider the case where the asset process 𝑋 is not completely observable by ordinary
investors on the market. More precisely, the D-investor obtains information about the asset value only at
discrete times which include the adjustment times 𝑡𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝑛− 1}, of the default barrier. We denote
the information dates between two adjustment times 𝑡𝑘 and 𝑡𝑘+1 by 𝑇 𝑘𝑖 , 𝑘 = 0, . . . , 𝑛−1, 𝑖 = 0, . . . , 𝐽𝑘−1,
where 𝑇 𝑘0 := 𝑡𝑘, 𝑇 𝑘𝑖−1 < 𝑇 𝑘𝑖 , 𝑇 𝑘𝐽𝑘−1 < 𝑡𝑘+1, 𝑇
𝑘
𝐽𝑘
:= 𝑡𝑘+1 and
∑︀𝑛−1
𝑘=0 𝐽𝑘 = 𝐽 . Further, we introduce
𝐾𝑘𝑗 (ℓ) = P(𝑀[𝑇𝑘
𝑗−1,𝑇
𝑘
𝑗
) > ℓ|𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑗−1
, 𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑗
) and 𝐾𝑘,𝑖(ℓ) =
𝑖∏︁
𝑗=1
𝐾𝑘𝑗 (ℓ) (13)
for 𝑘 = 0, . . . , 𝑛− 1, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝐽𝑘.
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Lemma 3.6. The conditional probabilities 𝐾𝑘𝑗 (ℓ), 𝑘 = 0, . . . , 𝑛−1, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝐽𝑘, defined in (13) are given
by
𝐾𝑘𝑗 (ℓ) = 1− exp
{︂ −2
𝜎2(𝑇 𝑘𝑗 − 𝑇 𝑘𝑗−1)
ln
(︂
ℓ
𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑗−1
)︂
ln
(︂
ℓ
𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑗
)︂}︂
,
for ℓ < min(𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑗−1
, 𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑗
) and 𝐾𝑘𝑗 (ℓ) = 0 otherwise.
Proof. The proof is given in Jeanblanc & Valchev [14, Lemma 2].
The next theorem shows that the conditional survival probability given the information of a D-investor can
be formulated in terms of F𝐷-conditional survival probabilities for which explicit formulas are derived.
Theorem 3.7. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.3 for the conditional survival probability given the
information of a D-investor it holds
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢𝐷𝑡 ) = 1{𝜏>𝑡}
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝐷𝑡 )
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝐷𝑡 )
for 𝑡 < 𝑇, (14)
where the F𝐷-conditional survival probabilities are given by the following formulas for 𝑛 ≥ 2:
1. For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇 𝑘𝑖 , 𝑇 𝑘𝑖+1), 𝑘 = 0, . . . , 𝑛− 2, 𝑖 = 0, . . . , 𝐽𝑘 − 1, it holds
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝐷𝑡 ) =
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
. . .
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
𝑓𝑀,𝑋
𝑇𝑘+10 −𝑇𝑘𝑖
(𝑢𝑘+1, 𝑣𝑘+1)
𝑛−1∏︁
𝑗=𝑘+2
𝑓𝑀,𝑋
𝑇 𝑗0−𝑇 𝑗−10
(𝑢𝑗 , 𝑣𝑗)
1∫︁
0
𝑓𝑀
𝑇−𝑇𝑛−10
(𝑤)
∞∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
. . .
∞∫︁
0
𝑢𝑘+1𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑖∫︁
0
𝑢𝑘+2𝑣𝑘+1𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑖∫︁
0
. . .
𝑢𝑛−1𝑣𝑛−2...𝑣𝑘+1𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑖∫︁
0
𝑤𝑣𝑛−1...𝑣𝑘+1𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑖∫︁
0
𝑘−1∏︁
𝑗=0
𝐾𝑗,𝐽𝑗 (ℓ𝑗+1)𝐾𝑘,𝑖(ℓ𝑘+1)𝑓𝐿1,...,𝐿𝑛(ℓ1, . . . , ℓ𝑛)dℓ𝑛 . . . dℓ1d𝑤d𝑣𝑛−1d𝑢𝑛−1 . . . d𝑣𝑘+1d𝑢𝑘+1.
(15)
For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇𝑛−1𝑖 , 𝑇𝑛−1𝑖+1 ), 𝑖 = 0, . . . , 𝐽𝑛−1 − 1, it holds
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝐷𝑡 ) =
∞∫︁
0
. . .
∞∫︁
0
𝐾𝑛−1,𝑖(ℓ𝑛)
𝑛−2∏︁
𝑗=0
𝐾𝑗,𝐽𝑗 (ℓ𝑗+1)Ψ
(︂
𝑇 − 𝑇𝑛−1𝑖 ,
ℓ𝑛
𝑋𝑇𝑛−1
𝑖
)︂
𝑓𝐿1,...,𝐿𝑛(ℓ1, . . . , ℓ𝑛)
dℓ𝑛 . . . dℓ1. (16)
2. For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇 𝑘𝑖 , 𝑇 𝑘𝑖+1), 𝑘 = 0, . . . , 𝑛− 1, 𝑖 = 0, . . . , 𝐽𝑘 − 1, it holds
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝐷𝑡 ) =
∞∫︁
0
. . .
∞∫︁
0
𝑘−1∏︁
𝑗=0
𝐾𝑗,𝐽𝑗 (ℓ𝑗+1)𝐾𝑘,𝑖(ℓ𝑘+1)Ψ
(︃
𝑡− 𝑇 𝑘𝑖 ,
ℓ𝑘+1
𝑋𝑇𝑘
𝑖
)︃
𝑓𝐿1,...,𝐿𝑘+1(ℓ1, . . . , ℓ𝑘+1)dℓ𝑘+1 . . . dℓ1. (17)
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Remark 3.8. For the special case of a constant but random default barrier, i.e., 𝑛 = 1 and 𝐿𝑡 = 𝐿1, the
F𝐷-conditional survival probabilities are given by the following formulas: Let 𝑇𝑗 , 𝑗 = 0, . . . , 𝐽 − 1, where
0 = 𝑇0 < 𝑇1 < . . . < 𝑇𝐽−1 < 𝑇𝐽 = 𝑇 for 𝐽 ∈ N, denote the times where the D-investor obtains information
about the firm’s asset value. For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇𝑖, 𝑇𝑖+1), 𝑖 = 0, . . . , 𝐽 − 1, it holds
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢𝐷𝑡 ) =1{𝜏>𝑡}
∫︀ 1
0
∫︀𝑋𝑇𝑖𝑤
0
∏︀𝑖
𝑗=1𝐾𝑗(ℓ1)𝑓𝐿1(ℓ1)𝑓
̂︀𝑀
𝑇−𝑇𝑖(𝑤)dℓ
1d𝑤
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝐷𝑡 ) =
∫︀ 1
0
∫︀𝑋𝑇𝑖𝑤
0
∏︀𝑖
𝑗=1𝐾𝑗(ℓ1)𝑓𝐿1(ℓ1)𝑓
̂︀𝑀
𝑡−𝑇𝑖(𝑤)dℓ
1d𝑤
, (18)
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where
𝐾𝑗(ℓ) = P(𝑀[𝑇𝑗−1,𝑇𝑗) > ℓ|𝑋𝑇𝑗−1 , 𝑋𝑇𝑗 ).
Remark 3.9. Let 𝐶𝑡 be the price of a zero-coupon bond that matures at 𝑇 and has zero recovery. Assuming
that the pricing probability is P, then 𝐶𝑡 is given by
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)E[1{𝜏>𝑇} | 𝒢𝐷𝑡 ] = 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)1{𝜏>𝑡}
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝐷𝑡 )
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝐷𝑡 )
,
where 𝑟 ≥ 0 is a discount factor. The credit spread 𝑆𝑡 is given by
𝑆𝑡 = − 1
𝑇 − 𝑡 ln{P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝒢
𝐷
𝑡 )}.
4 Numerical examples
In this section we implement the formulas for the default probabilities derived in the previous section by
evaluating the integrals using the Gauss–Kronrod quadrature formula (see Monegato [19]) and quantify
numerically the impact of asymmetric information on the estimations of the default probabilities and credit
spreads. More numerical examples can be found in Redeker [20].
The parameters for the firm’s asset value process are taken from Blanchet-Scalliet, Hillairet &
Jiao [4], i.e.,
𝑋0 = 1, 𝜇 = 0.05 and 𝜎 = 0.8.
We consider a time horizon of 𝑇 = 2 years and we suppose that a firm’s management decides at 𝑡0 = 0
on a default threshold 𝐿1. Further, we assume that the management adjusts the default threshold at
𝑡1 = 1 from 𝐿1 to 𝐿2. C-investors and D-investors only have knowledge on the (marginal and joint) laws
of L = (𝐿1, 𝐿2). The law of L = (𝐿1, 𝐿2) is modeled by a copula. In the following examples C-investors
and D-investors assume that 𝐿1 is beta distributed with parameters (𝛼, 𝛽) = (2, 2) and 𝐿2 is exponentially
distributed with parameter 𝜆 = 2/3. Further, investors assume that the law of L is given by a Gumbel
copula 𝐶, i.e.,
𝐶(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = exp
{︁
− [︀(− ln(𝑥1))𝜃 + (− ln(𝑥2))𝜃]︀ 1𝜃}︁ ,
for some 𝜃 ≥ 1 (see Bluhm & Overbeck [5]). Thus, the correlation between 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 is modeled by
the parameter 𝜃, where 𝜃 = 1 corresponds to the case of independent default thresholds.
The top panel of Figure 2 presents a realized trajectory of the firm’s asset process, the switching default
threshold and the running minimum of the firm value which is restarted after adjustment of the default
threshold. We observe that no default occurs before maturity and the realizations of the default thresholds
are given by 𝐿1(𝜔) = 0.6 and 𝐿2(𝜔) = 1.2. The middle panel of Figure 2 shows the associated conditional
survival probability given the information of a C-investor for different values of 𝜃 (𝜃 = 1, 2, 100). We observe
that the conditional survival probability converges to one, since no default has occurred by maturity. If
𝐿1 and 𝐿2 are independent, i.e., 𝜃 = 1, the estimate of the survival probability is smaller compared to the
cases of dependent 𝐿1 and 𝐿2. However, differences in the conditional survival probability between 𝜃 = 1,
𝜃 = 2 and 𝜃 = 100 become smaller with increasing time. The bottom panel of Figure 2 illustrates the
associated credit yield spread given the information of a C-investor for different values of 𝜃 (𝜃 = 1, 2, 100).
The credit spread tends to zero as the time 𝑡 approaches maturity 𝑇 since the C-investor has learned about
the default threshold and knows that the firm is not subject to default in the next instance of time. If 𝐿1
and 𝐿2 are independent, i.e., 𝜃 = 1, the credit yield spread is higher compared to the cases of dependent
𝐿1 and 𝐿2.
Figure 3 illustrates the conditional survival probability and the credit spread given the information of a
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(a) Firm value, running minimum process and default threshold.
(b) Conditional survival probability given the information of a C-investor.
(c) Credit yield spread given the information of a C-investor.
Fig. 2. Plot of a trajectory of the firm’s asset process and the associated conditional survival probability and
credit spread given the information of a C-investor for different values of 𝜃.
D-investor for the case of independent default thresholds (𝜃 = 1) and different information time points
(biannually, quarterly, monthly). We observe that the more frequently a D-investor obtains information
about the firm value the closer are the D-investor’s and C-investor’s estimates of the survival probability.
The credit yield spread given the information of a D-investor is non-zero at maturity, i.e., D-investors
demand a risk premium for the default risk. D-investors who obtain information about the firm value
twice a year demand the highest risk premium followed by D-investors who obtain that information every
quarter. The lowest risk premium is demanded by D-investors who obtain information about the firm
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(a) Firm value, running minimum process and default threshold.
(b) Conditional survival probabilities given the information of a C-investor and D-investors.
(c) Credit yield spreads given the information of a C-investor and D-investors.
Fig. 3. Plot of a trajectory of the firm’s asset process and the associated conditional survival probabilities and
credit spreads given the information of a C-investor and D-investors for 𝜃 = 1.
value every month. This indicates that the risk premium depends on the frequency of observations of the
firm value and the associated time to maturity at the last information date. Recall that the D-investors
who obtain information about the firm value twice a year, every quarter and every month receive the last
information before 𝑇 at 𝑡 = 1.5, 𝑡 = 1.75 and 𝑡 = 1.9167, respectively. At these time points the firm value
is 𝑋1.5 ≈ 3.24, 𝑋1.75 ≈ 3.27 and 𝑋1.9167 ≈ 2.96. Thus, the D-investor who observes the firm value every
month demands the highest risk premium. Furthermore, the last observed firm value before 𝑇 is almost
equal for the other two D-investors but the D-investor who obtains information twice a year demands a
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higher risk premium compared to the D-investor who observes the firm value every quarter. This indicates
that the risk premium also depends on the frequency of observations of the firm value and the associated
time to maturity at the last information date.
(a) Firm value, running minimum process and default threshold.
(b) Conditional survival probability given the information of a C-investor.
(c) Credit yield spread given the information of a C-investor.
Fig. 4. Plot of a trajectory of the firm’s asset process and the associated conditional survival probability and
credit spread given the information of a C-investor for different values of 𝜃.
A second example is presented by Figure 4. The top panel shows a realized trajectory of the firm’s asset
process, the switching default threshold and the running minimum of the firm value which is restarted
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after adjustment of the default threshold. We observe that default occurs in the second year. The middle
and bottom panel illustrate the associated conditional survival probability and credit yield spread given
the information of a C-investor for different values of 𝜃 (𝜃 = 1, 2, 100). We observe that the conditional
survival probability jumps to zero at the time of default.
(a) Firm value, running minimum process and default threshold.
(b) Conditional survival probabilities given the information of a C-investor and D-investors.
(c) Credit yield spreads given the information of a C-investor and D-investors.
Fig. 5. Plot of a trajectory of the firm’s asset process and the associated conditional survival probabilities and
credit spreads given the information of a C-investor and D-investors for 𝜃 = 1.
Figure 5 illustrates the conditional survival probability and credit yield spread given the information of a
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D-investor for the case of independent default thresholds (𝜃 = 1). The D-investors obtain information about
the firm value twice a year, every quarter and every month, respectively. We observe that the conditional
survival probabilities jump to zero at the time of default.
We note that the estimates of the conditional survival probabilities given the information of a C-investor
(a) Firm value, running minimum process and default threshold.
(b) Conditional survival probabilities given the information of a C-investor and a D-investor.
(c) Credit yield spreads given the information of a C-investorand a D-investor.
Fig. 6. Plot of a trajectory of the firm’s asset process and the associated conditional survival probabilities and
credit yield spreads given the information of a C-investor and a D-investor. The D-investor obtains
information about the firm value once in 2.5 years.
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and a D-investor are very close at the D-investor’s information dates in the examples presented above.
This is no longer the case if we extend the time horizon. We present a special case, where the default
threshold is taken to be just a random constant of the form 𝑦 = 𝐿 as proposed in Giesecke & Goldberg
[8] and the time horizon is extended to 𝑇 = 5 years. C-investors and D-investors assume that 𝐿 follows
a standard uniform distribution. The top panel of Figure 6 shows a realized trajectory of the firm value,
the associated running minimum and a realization of the default threshold. The middle and bottom panel
show the associated conditional survival probabilities and credit yield spreads given the information of a
C-investor and a D-investor, respectively. The D-investor obtains information about the firm value once
in 2.5 years. We observe that the C-investor’s estimate of the conditional survival probability and the
D-investor’s estimate of the conditional survival probability are now visibly different at the information
date of the D-investor. The credit yield spread at 𝑇 is zero given the information of the C-investor and
nonzero given the information of the D-investor.
5 Conclusion
This paper extends the traditional structural model for credit risk. In the proposed model the default of a
firm is triggered when the value of the firm’s assets falls below a threshold which is modeled as a sequence
of random variables whose values are chosen by the management of the firm and dynamically adjusted
accounting for changes in the economy or the appointment of a new firm management. Investors on the
market have no access to the value of the threshold and only anticipate its distribution. Different information
levels on the firm value are distinguished and explicit formulas for the conditional default probability
and associated credit yield spreads given these information levels are derived. Numerical illustrations are
provided which show that the information level has a considerable impact on the estimation of the default
probability and the associated credit yield spread. Investors who have perfect information on the value
process of the firm learn about the default threshold, i.e., they learn that the default threshold must lie
below the current running minimum of the firm value if default has not yet occurred. Thus, the larger
the distance of the firm value to the running minimum the less likely is a default and investors adjust
their estimation of the default probability accordingly. The associated credit yield spreads are high if the
firm value is close to its running minimum and low otherwise. Especially, if the firm value is far above its
running minimum just before maturity investors know that there will be no default in the next instance
of time and they do not demand a default risk premium, i.e., the credit spread is zero. This is different
for investors who do not have full access to the value process of the firm. Investors who only observe the
firm value at specific dates cannot be certain about the firm value just before maturity and they demand a
nonzero default risk premium. Furthermore, the credit spreads at maturity depend on their last observed
firm value and the frequency of firm value observations. In future research the dynamics of defaultable
bonds are studied in this model set-up.
A Proof of Theorem 3.7
Observe that F𝐷 ⊂ F. Then the proof of Eq. (14) is along the same line as the proof of Eq. (8) for the case
of a C-investor. For the sake of a simple notation we prove the remaining formulas of the theorem for the
case 𝑛 = 2, i.e., the threshold is 𝐿1 in the interval [𝑡0, 𝑡1) and 𝐿2 in the interval [𝑡1, 𝑇 ). The proof for 𝑛 > 2
is along the same line and skipped. In order to keep the notation simple we denote the times at which the
D-investor observes the asset process by 𝑇𝑖, 𝑖 = 0, . . . , 𝐽 − 1, where 𝑇0 := 𝑡0, 𝑇𝐽 := 𝑇 and 𝑇𝑗 = 𝑡1 for some
𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝐽 − 1}. The last term ensures that the D-investor obtains information about the asset process
at the adjustment time 𝑡1 of the default threshold. We define the processes (𝑌 𝑖𝑢)𝑢≥0 by
𝑌 𝑖𝑢 = exp{𝑚𝑢+ 𝜎 ̂︀𝐵𝑖𝑢}, for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝐽 − 1,
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where ( ̂︀𝐵𝑖𝑢)𝑢≥0 is a Brownian motion independent of ℱ𝑇𝑖 and given by ̂︀𝐵𝑖𝑢 = 𝐵𝑇𝑖+𝑢 − 𝐵𝑇𝑖 . Note that
𝑌 𝑖𝑢 inherits the independence of ℱ𝑇𝑖 and it has the same law as 𝑋𝑢. Further we have the decomposition
𝑋𝑠 = 𝑋𝑇𝑖𝑌 𝑖𝑠−𝑇𝑖 for 𝑠 > 𝑇𝑖. We denote by (̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑢)𝑢≥0 the running minimum of 𝑌 𝑖, i.e.,̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑢 = inf
𝑠<𝑢
𝑌 𝑖𝑠 .
Proof of (15): Let 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡0, 𝑡1) and 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇𝑖, 𝑇𝑖+1) with 𝑖 < 𝑗, i.e., 𝑇𝑖+1 ≤ 𝑇𝑗 = 𝑡1, then
{𝜏 > 𝑇} ={𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑡1,𝑇 )} = {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖} ∩ {𝐿1 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑖,𝑡1)} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑡1,𝑇 )}
={𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖} ∩ {𝐿1 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑖,𝑇𝑗)} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇 )}
={𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖} ∩ {𝐿1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑇𝑗−𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑇𝑖} ∩ {𝐿2 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑗𝑇−𝑇𝑗𝑌 𝑖𝑇𝑗−𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑇𝑖}.
Then we have
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝐷𝑡 ) =P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝐷𝑇𝑖) = P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 , 𝐿1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑇𝑗−𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑇𝑖 , 𝐿2 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑗𝑇−𝑇𝑗𝑌 𝑖𝑇𝑗−𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑇𝑖 |ℱ𝐷𝑇𝑖)
=
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 , 𝐿1 < 𝑢𝑋𝑇𝑖 , 𝐿2 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑗𝑇−𝑇𝑗𝑣𝑋𝑇𝑖 |ℱ𝐷𝑇𝑖)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑖,𝑌 𝑖𝑇𝑗−𝑇𝑖 (𝑢, 𝑣)d𝑣d𝑢
=
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
1∫︁
0
P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 , 𝐿1 < 𝑢𝑋𝑇𝑖 , 𝐿2 < 𝑤𝑣𝑋𝑇𝑖 |ℱ𝐷𝑇𝑖)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑗𝑇−𝑇𝑗 (𝑤)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑖,𝑌 𝑖𝑇𝑗−𝑇𝑖 (𝑢, 𝑣)d𝑤d𝑣d𝑢
=
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 , ℓ1 < 𝑢𝑋𝑇𝑖 , ℓ2 < 𝑤𝑣𝑋𝑇𝑖 |ℱ𝐷𝑇𝑖)
𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑗𝑇−𝑇𝑗 (𝑤)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑖,𝑌 𝑖𝑇𝑗−𝑇𝑖 (𝑢, 𝑣)dℓ2dℓ1d𝑤d𝑣d𝑢
=
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
1∫︁
0
𝑢𝑋𝑇𝑖∫︁
0
𝑤𝑣𝑋𝑇𝑖∫︁
0
P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 |ℱ𝐷𝑇𝑖)𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑗𝑇−𝑇𝑗 (𝑤)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑖,𝑌 𝑖𝑇𝑗−𝑇𝑖 (𝑢, 𝑣)dℓ2dℓ1d𝑤d𝑣d𝑢,
where we have used in the second to last equation that (𝐿1, 𝐿2) is independent of ℱ𝑇 . Since 𝑌 𝑖𝑢 𝑑= 𝑋𝑢, for
𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝐽 − 1, 𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑖𝑡 and 𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑖,𝑌 𝑖𝑡 are given in (5) and (6), respectively. Before we calculate the probability
in the above integrand we make the following notation
𝑃𝑖(ℓ) = P(ℓ < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖).
It holds
{ℓ < 𝑀𝑇𝑖} = {ℓ < inf
𝑠<𝑇𝑖
𝑋𝑠} = {ℓ < inf
𝑠<𝑇𝑖−1
𝑋𝑠} ∩ {ℓ < inf
𝑇𝑖−1≤𝑠<𝑇𝑖
𝑋𝑠} = {ℓ < 𝑀𝑇𝑖−1} ∩ {ℓ < 𝑀[𝑇𝑖−1,𝑇𝑖)}.
We have
𝑃𝑖(ℓ1) =P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖) = E[1{ℓ1<𝑀𝑇𝑖}|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ]
=E[1{ℓ1<𝑀𝑇𝑖−1}1{ℓ1<𝑀[𝑇𝑖−1,𝑇𝑖)}|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ]
=E[E[1{ℓ1<𝑀𝑇𝑖−1}1{ℓ1<𝑀[𝑇𝑖−1,𝑇𝑖)}|𝑋𝑠 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑖−1, 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ]|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ],
where the last equation follows from the tower property of the conditional expectation since
𝜎(𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖) ⊂ ℱ𝑇𝑖−1 ∨ 𝜎(𝑋𝑇𝑖).
We obtain
𝑃𝑖(ℓ1) =E[E[1{ℓ1<𝑀𝑇𝑖−1}1{ℓ1<𝑀[𝑇𝑖−1,𝑇𝑖)}|𝑋𝑠 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑖−1, 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ]|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ]
=E[1{ℓ1<𝑀𝑇𝑖−1}E[1{ℓ1<𝑀[𝑇𝑖−1,𝑇𝑖)}|𝑋𝑠 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑖−1, 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ]|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ]
=E[1{ℓ1<𝑀𝑇𝑖−1}P(ℓ
1 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑖−1,𝑇𝑖)|𝑋𝑠 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑖−1, 𝑋𝑇𝑖)|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ],
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where we have used that 𝑀𝑇𝑖−1 is ℱ𝑇𝑖−1 -measurable. The probability in the above equation is rewritten as
P(ℓ1 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑖−1,𝑇𝑖)|𝑋𝑠 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑖−1, 𝑋𝑇𝑖) =P(ℓ1 < inf𝑇𝑖−1≤𝑠<𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑠|𝑋𝑠 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑖−1, 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=P(ℓ1 < inf
𝑇𝑖−1≤𝑠<𝑇𝑖
𝑋𝑇𝑖−1𝑌
𝑖−1
𝑠−𝑇𝑖−1 |𝑋𝑠 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑖−1, 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=P(ℓ1/𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖−1𝑇𝑖−𝑇𝑖−1 |𝑋𝑠 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑖−1, 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=P(ℓ1/𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖−1𝑇𝑖−𝑇𝑖−1 |𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 , 𝑋𝑇𝑖),
where last equation holds since ̂︁𝑀 𝑖−1𝑇𝑖−𝑇𝑖−1 is independent of ℱ𝑇𝑖−1 . Finally, we obtain the following recursion
formula
𝑃𝑖(ℓ1) =E[1{ℓ1<𝑀𝑇𝑖−1}P(ℓ
1 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑖−1,𝑇𝑖)|𝑋𝑠 : 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑖−1, 𝑋𝑇𝑖)|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ]
=E[1{ℓ1<𝑀𝑇𝑖−1}P(ℓ
1/𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖−1𝑇𝑖−𝑇𝑖−1 |𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖 ]
=E[1{ℓ1<𝑀𝑇𝑖−1}|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 ]P(ℓ
1/𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖−1𝑇𝑖−𝑇𝑖−1 |𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖−1 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖−1)P(ℓ1/𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖−1𝑇𝑖−𝑇𝑖−1 |𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=𝑃𝑖−1(ℓ1)P(ℓ1/𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖−1𝑇𝑖−𝑇𝑖−1 |𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 , 𝑋𝑇𝑖).
Lemma 3.6 yields
P(ℓ1/𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖−1𝑇𝑖−𝑇𝑖−1 |𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 , 𝑋𝑇𝑖) =1− exp{︂ −2𝜎2(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑇𝑖−1) ln
(︁ ℓ1
𝑋𝑇𝑖−1
)︁
ln
(︁ ℓ1
𝑋𝑇𝑖
)︁}︂
for ℓ1 < min(𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 , 𝑋𝑇𝑖) and zero otherwise. Note that
𝐾𝑖(ℓ) = 1− exp
{︂ −2
𝜎2(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑇𝑖−1) ln
(︂
ℓ
𝑋𝑇𝑖−1
)︂
ln
(︂
ℓ
𝑋𝑇𝑖
)︂}︂
,
for ℓ < min(𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 , 𝑋𝑇𝑖) and 𝐾𝑖(ℓ) = 0 otherwise. Then the probability 𝑃𝑖(ℓ1) can be recursively calculated
by
𝑃𝑖(ℓ1) = P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖) = 𝑃𝑖−1(ℓ1)P(ℓ1/𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖−1𝑇𝑖−𝑇𝑖−1 |𝑋𝑇𝑖−1 , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
= 𝑃𝑖−1(ℓ1)𝐾𝑖(ℓ1) = 𝑃𝑖−2(ℓ1)𝐾𝑖−1(ℓ1)𝐾𝑖(ℓ1) = . . . =
𝑖∏︁
𝑗=1
𝐾𝑗(ℓ1),
since 𝑃0(ℓ1) = P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇0 |𝑋𝑇0) = P(ℓ1 < 𝑋𝑇0 |𝑋𝑇0) = 1{ℓ1<𝑋𝑇0}.
Eventually we obtain for 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡0, 𝑡1) and 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇𝑖, 𝑇𝑖+1) that
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝐷𝑡 ) =
1∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
1∫︁
0
𝑢𝑋𝑇𝑖∫︁
0
𝑤𝑣𝑋𝑇𝑖∫︁
0
𝑃𝑖(ℓ1)𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑗𝑇−𝑇𝑗 (𝑤)𝑓 ̂︀𝑀𝑖,𝑌 𝑖𝑇𝑗−𝑇𝑖 (𝑢, 𝑣)dℓ2dℓ1d𝑤d𝑣d𝑢.
Proof of (16): Let 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡1, 𝑇 ) and 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇𝑖, 𝑇𝑖+1) with 𝑖 ≥ 𝑗, i.e., 𝑡1 = 𝑇𝑗 ≤ 𝑇𝑖. Then
{𝜏 > 𝑇} ={𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑡1,𝑇 )} = {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇 )}
={𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑖,𝑇 )}
={𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)} ∩ {𝐿2 < inf𝑇𝑖≤𝑠<𝑇 𝑋𝑠}
={𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)} ∩ {𝐿2 < inf𝑇𝑖≤𝑠<𝑇 𝑋𝑇𝑖𝑌
𝑖
𝑠−𝑇𝑖}
={𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑋𝑇𝑖̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑇−𝑇𝑖}
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and we obtain
P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝐷𝑡 ) =P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |ℱ𝐷𝑇𝑖) = P(𝜏 > 𝑇 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗 , 𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖), 𝐿
2 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑇−𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑇𝑖 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=
∞∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗 , ℓ2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖), ℓ
2 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑇−𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑇𝑖 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)dℓ2dℓ1
=
∞∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗 , ℓ2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)P(ℓ2/𝑋𝑇𝑖 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑇−𝑇𝑖)𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)dℓ2dℓ1
=
∞∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗 , ℓ2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)Ψ
(︂
𝑇 − 𝑇𝑖, ℓ
2
𝑋𝑇𝑖
)︂
𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)dℓ2dℓ1
=
∞∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
𝑗∏︁
𝑘=1
𝐾𝑘(ℓ1)
𝑖∏︁
𝑘=𝑗+1
𝐾𝑘(ℓ2)Ψ
(︂
𝑇 − 𝑇𝑖, ℓ
2
𝑋𝑇𝑖
)︂
𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)dℓ2dℓ1
=
∞∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
𝑃𝑗(ℓ1)
𝑖∏︁
𝑘=𝑗+1
𝐾𝑘(ℓ2)Ψ
(︂
𝑇 − 𝑇𝑖, ℓ
2
𝑋𝑇𝑖
)︂
𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)dℓ2dℓ1,
where Ψ(𝑡, ·) is the complementary distribution function of 𝑀𝑡 given in Lemma 3.2.
Proof of (17): Let 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡0, 𝑡1) and 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇𝑖, 𝑇𝑖+1). Then
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝐷𝑡 ) =P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡|ℱ𝐷𝑡 ) = P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡|ℱ𝐷𝑇𝑖) = P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 , 𝐿1 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑖,𝑡)|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖) = P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 , 𝐿1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑇𝑖 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=
∞∫︁
0
P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 , ℓ1 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑇𝑖 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)𝑓𝐿1(ℓ1)dℓ1
=
∞∫︁
0
P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑖 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)P(ℓ1/𝑋𝑇𝑖 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑖)𝑓𝐿1(ℓ1)dℓ1
=
∞∫︁
0
𝑃𝑖(ℓ1)Ψ
(︂
𝑡− 𝑇𝑖, ℓ
1
𝑋𝑇𝑖
)︂
𝑓𝐿1(ℓ1)dℓ1.
The second to last equation follows by the independence from ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑖 of 𝑇𝑖 and the last equation holds
since ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑖 𝑑=𝑀𝑡−𝑇𝑖 .
For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡1, 𝑇 ) and 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇𝑖, 𝑇𝑖+1) with 𝑖 ≥ 𝑗, i.e., 𝑡1 = 𝑇𝑗 ≤ 𝑇𝑖, it holds
{𝜏 > 𝑇} = {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑡1} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑡1,𝑡)} = {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑡)}
= {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑖,𝑡)}
= {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)} ∩ {𝐿2 < inf𝑇𝑖≤𝑠<𝑡𝑋𝑠}
= {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)} ∩ {𝐿2 < inf𝑇𝑖≤𝑠<𝑡𝑋𝑇𝑖𝑌
𝑖
𝑠−𝑇𝑖}
= {𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)} ∩ {𝐿2 < 𝑋𝑇𝑖̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑖}.
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Using the same arguments as above yields
P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝐷𝑡 ) =P(𝜏 > 𝑡|ℱ𝐷𝑇𝑖) = P(𝜏 > 𝑡|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=P(𝐿1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗 , 𝐿2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖), 𝐿
2 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑇𝑖 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)
=
∞∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗 , ℓ2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖), ℓ
2 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑖𝑋𝑇𝑖 |𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)dℓ2dℓ1
=
∞∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
P(ℓ1 < 𝑀𝑇𝑗 , ℓ2 < 𝑀[𝑇𝑗 ,𝑇𝑖)|𝑋𝑇0 , . . . , 𝑋𝑇𝑖)P(ℓ2/𝑋𝑇𝑖 < ̂︁𝑀 𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑖)𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)dℓ2dℓ1
=
∞∫︁
0
∞∫︁
0
𝑃𝑗(ℓ1)
𝑖∏︁
𝑘=𝑗+1
𝐾𝑘(ℓ2)Ψ
(︂
𝑡− 𝑇𝑖, ℓ
2
𝑋𝑇𝑖
)︂
𝑓𝐿1,𝐿2(ℓ1, ℓ2)dℓ2dℓ1.
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